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Equitable Compensation: Quantifying the Salary Differences of
Comparison Communities
Margaret A. Murray
University of Massachusetts Lowell

Teacher salary scales from a target district are compared with those from six groups of
comparable districts to provide a quantitative basis from which to assess self-serving bias in the
selection of comparison districts. Comparison districts are used to gauge salary equity during
contract negotiations. Salary data were extracted for three salary columns (bachelor’s, master’s,
and master’s plus 30 credits) from the 2014–15 Massachusetts teacher contracts from forty-eight
districts. Comparison district groups were formed using six methods: three single-criterion and
three multiple-criteria. Implications for selecting methods are also discussed.
______________________________________________________________________________

Decreases in state aid coupled with disproportional increases in

health care costs continue to
strain municipal budgets in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Between FY2008 and
FY2012, inflation-adjusted state aid was cut 36 percent.1 Health care costs, however, have
surged, outpacing the modest growth in property taxes. A 2014 Massachusetts Taxpayer
Foundation study of nine low-income small cities, for example, found that retiree health care
costs increased 24.0 percent between FY2009 and FY2013, while property tax revenue increased
12.1 percent.2
These fiscal pressures have diminished budget allocations, particularly for salaries, which
account for the largest percentage of budget expenditures. But not all municipalities have
experienced the same level of diminishing salary resources. A Boston Business Bureau report
notes, for example, that “many school districts have seen average teacher pay jump in recent
years, while others have made cuts.”3 The variations in compensation levels affect collective
bargaining as teachers seek to achieve parity with peer districts.
In determining whether teacher salaries are equitable, news organizations and districts
typically use the average teacher salary data from the Massachusetts Department of Elementary
and Secondary Education (DESE).4 But since teacher salaries are based on automatic step and
column increases for years of experience and educational attainment, respectively, district
variations may be an artifact of their population composition rather than their compensation
policies. Thus, comparisons to assess equitable compensation levels should be made against the
salary scales of comparable communities.
This article reports on a study that compares the teacher salary scales from six groups of
comparable communities with those of a target district to determine whether the target district’s
compensation policy is equitable with that of the comparable groups. Salary data were extracted
from the 2014–15 Massachusetts teacher contracts. The comparison groups were formed using
three single-criterion and three multiple-criteria methods. Single-criterion methods identify
comparables using a single parameter; multiple-criteria methods use combinations of
demographic, economic, and geographic variables. Minimum and maximum thresholds are
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established for each variable, and a filtering process identifies communities that satisfy the
specified thresholds on all values.

Single-Criterion Methods
Single-criterion methods are appealing in their simplicity—inclusion is not subject to debate.
The criteria for the methods used in this study include proximity to the target district,
membership in an athletic league, and household income.
Comparison based on proximity is referred to as the two-ring method. One of the oldest and
most widely used single-criterion method, it has been described as the status quo because of its
widespread use by municipal managers.5 Municipalities that share borders with the target district
make up the first ring; municipalities that share borders with the first ring make up the second
ring. The two-ring method represents the available labor pool. In this study, six districts border
the target district (the first ring) and fourteen districts border the first ring. Four of the districts,
however, were regionalized, decreasing the total number of potential comparison districts to
sixteen
Where the composition of comparables is based on athletic-league membership, districts in
the league share such similarities as size, financial resources, and labor market characteristics.6
The athletic league in which the target district held membership included nine potential
comparison districts.
The U.S. Census Bureau provides data for household income, a metric that is commonly
used to gauge household welfare.7 The identification of comparison communities based on
household income involves selecting an equal number of districts that fall below and above the
target district’s household income. The target district had selected five districts on either side, for
a total of ten potential comparison districts.

Multiple-Criteria Methods
Unlike the single-criterion method, which offers a straightforward selection process, the
multiple-criteria method requires agreement from the target district about the parameters and the
size of the variation. Once agreement is reached, a single data file is constructed from multiple
sources. Some municipalities contract with consultants to establish the selection, some use
members of elected boards, and others reach agreement during collective bargaining.8 In
previous negotiations, the target district had used the collective bargaining process to establish
comparable communities. This multiple-criteria method, referred to hereafter as “negotiation,”
identified fourteen potential comparison districts.
The process of specifying multiple parameters to select comparable districts has been
streamlined with the use of online tools from the DESE and the Division of Local Services
(DLS). In 2010 the DESE released the District Analysis Review Tool (DART), which provides
access to school- and district-level comparison data. The district-level tool generates the names
of comparable districts based on “grade span, total enrollment, and special populations.” The
special populations include low-income students, students with disabilities, and English language
learners. The DART produced ten potential comparison districts.9
In May 2012, the Commonwealth introduced a web-based tool that has “the ability to create
customized community comparison reports” directly from the DLS website.10 Users specify
minimum and maximum values for five criteria as the basis for comparison: population, average
single-family tax bill, per capita income, equivalent property value per capita, and total
2
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municipal budget. Unlike the DART, which limits comparisons to ten districts, the DLS method
generates a list whose length depends on the range of values specified—the larger the specified
range, the higher the number of matched comparables. Rather than select arbitrary values for
each parameter, minimum and maximum amounts were calculated for one standard deviation
above and below those of the target district for each of the five criteria. Outliers were removed
prior to the calculation to avoid distorting the data.11 (The outliers included seventeen cities with
populations exceeding sixty thousand, and seven towns whose equivalent property value per
capita exceeded one million dollars.) The specified values generated thirty-eight municipalities.
The target district had the tenth highest per capita income of this group. The DLS comparable
communities group comprised eighteen communities—nine above and nine below the per capita
income of the target district.

Salary Comparisons
Salary schedules for the majority of teacher contracts were obtained from the DESE website
(http://educatorcontracts.doemass.org). A 2008 amendment to Massachusetts General Laws
Chapter 15, Section 55A requires each district to supply the DESE with a copy of its collective
bargaining agreements by October 1 of each year. Districts that did not have current postings
were contacted individually. Of the fifty-two districts in the six methods, four were in mediation
or had not settled for the 2014–15 school year (Table 1). Note that some districts are included in
multiple methods.
Table 1. Sample Size for Each Comparison Method
Comparison method

Sample size

Athletic league

7

DESE

9

DLS

18

Household income

10

Negotiated

12

Two-ring

13

Teacher compensation is organized by steps and columns based on years of experience and
educational attainment, respectively. The number of steps in the target district (14) nearly
matched the average of the comparison districts (13.8). But the number of columns (3) was less
than half the average of the comparison districts (6.8). Despite the difference in column
configuration, the target district’s three columns (bachelor’s, master’s, and master’s plus 30
credits) were common to all districts except two, whose closest columns were master’s plus 36
and doctorate. The former was substituted for the master’s plus 30 column; the latter was
eliminated from the master’s plus 30 comparison. (Note that the Commonwealth requires
educators to complete their master’s degree within five years of hire. Because of this
requirement, analysis at the bachelor’s level was restricted to the first five steps.)
The target district’s salary columns were compared with the averages of peer districts using
the six methods. Differences between the target and comparison districts are expressed as a
3
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percentage; a positive percentage indicates a higher salary at the target district, a negative
percentage indicates that the target district lags behind the average of the comparison district
groups (Figures 1–3).
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Figure 1. Percentage differences in 2014–15 between the target district’s
teacher salary steps and the average steps in the bachelor’s column for six
comparison district groups
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Figure 2. Percentage differences in 2014–15 between the target district’s
teacher salary steps and the average steps in the master’s column for six
comparison district groups
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Figure 3. Percentage differences in 2014–15 between the target district’s
teacher salary steps and the average steps in the master’s plus 30 column for
six comparison district groups

Findings
The single-criterion athletic-league comparison is an outlier in the master’s (M) column in steps
5 through 10 and in the master’s plus 30 (M30) column in steps 8 through 14. Thus, it was
eliminated from all comparisons. The gap between the target district (TD) and the comparison
district groups indicates a steadily widening trajectory at the M level; this trajectory starts at step
4 where the TD’s compensation level is less than half that of all five comparison district groups.
The gap continues to widen until step 12, where the TD teachers are earning an average of -7.6
percent less than their peers at the five comparison districts.
The flattening at step 13 and the slight change at step 14 (-6.2 percent) are due to the
decreased number of steps in the comparison groups. For example, at M12, the five comparison
groups have an average of 11.2 steps; at M14 they have half that number (5.6). In order to extend
the comparison to the 14 steps of the TD, salaries for missing steps were calculated to increase at
the average rate of that district’s column. Except for a small number of districts (15 percent),
however, that have consistent between-step increases, the rate of step increases is not uniform.
The average increase for M and M30 is 4.2 percent, but the ranges extend from 0.6 percent to
14.5 percent.
The data indicate variations among the three columns. Unlike the M and M30 columns,
whose early steps compensate above the average of the comparison groups, all bachelor’s
column (B) steps fall below those of the comparison groups. Differences exist also between the
degree to which the TD lags behind M and M30. Starting at steps 4 and 5 for M and M30,
respectively, all comparison groups compensate at higher levels. The average difference is -5.6
percent at the M level and -3.5 percent at the M30 level. The difference between the M and M30
levels may reflect the multiple opportunities for educators in the peer districts to achieve higher
salary levels through additional columns (6.8 average compared with the 3 in the TD).
5
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Implications for Selecting Methods
All methods indicate that, except for the first four or five steps at the M and M30 levels, TD
educators are compensated at levels lower than those of their peers. Although the average
difference is negligible at the early steps, that difference exceeds 5 percent at B4, B5, and M7–
M13. It also approaches -5 percent at M30-13 (-4.8 percent) and is -5.1 percent at M30-14.
The TD’s capacity to adjust salaries to levels of comparable districts within the operational
budget are constrained by a statute (Proposition 2 ½) that limits annual property tax increases to
2 ½ percent of the assessed value of taxable property. The statute does permit citizens to raise
taxes beyond the 2 ½ percent limit through a ballot question. Passage of a ballot question to
achieve salary equity with comparable districts depends on multiple factors. Chief among them
are transparency and accountability, which form the basis of citizens’ trust in government and
have been linked to passage of operational overrides.12
A critical factor related to transparency and accountability is the elimination of the selfserving bias that is inherent in the selection of comparable districts. Research by Babcock, Wang
and Loewenstein in Pennsylvania underscores the influence of this bias on both sides of the
bargaining table. The researchers found that union presidents selected comparison districts
whose average salary was 2.4 percent greater than that of the comparables selected by the school
board president (p = .003).13 They also noted that the 2.4 percent difference is more than twice
the 1 percent gap between the typical final offers before strike activity in Pennsylvania during
the period studied. Another consideration is the ability of municipalities to meet their obligation
to negotiate in good faith and compensate educators at levels comparable to those of their peers,
that is, the “ability to pay” criteria.14 The accountability, self-serving bias, transparency, and
ability to pay elements of each method were examined to assess which grouping best satisfies
these conditions.

Accountability and Self-Serving Bias
Accountability and self-serving bias are inextricably linked. For example, though the singlecriterion selection method is transparent because of its simplicity, to minimize self-serving bias,
the selection must be justified in comparison with alternative methods. A comparison of the
cumulative percentage differences between the average of fourteen steps of the three salary
columns of the comparison district groups and those of the TD quantifies the self-serving bias
(Table 2). A low cumulative percentage difference (household income and two-ring) would favor
the cost-controlling interests of the municipality; a high percentage difference (negotiated and
DESE) would favor the compensation interests of the employees. The DLS method is the
midpoint between the two groups.
Table 2. Cumulative Column and Total Percentage Differences between
Compensation Levels for the Target District and Five Viable Comparison
District Groups
Column

Comparison district

Bachelor’s Master’s Master’s+30
6
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groups*

Total

Negotiated

-30.5%

-76.0%

-38.9%

-145.4%

DESE

-33.6%

-67.4%

-44.4% -144.4%

DLS

-27.2%

-59.6%

-15.2% -102.0%

Two-ring

-19.6%

-51.1%

-16.8% -87.4%

Household income

-21.1%

-41.5%

-16.3% -78.8%

*Average of 14 steps.

Transparency
The best way to achieve transparency is to explain to the public how the comparison districts are
selected. Of the five viable selection methods used in this study, the two-ring, the household
income, and the DESE methods are the most easily explained, two-ring and household income
because they use a single criterion, and the DESE because it is based on the expertise of the
Department of Education. Thus, these two methods have the highest transparency. The
negotiated method is the least transparent because it is constructed through collective bargaining
processes under the protection of executive session. And though the DLS method, like the DESE
method, uses a government-provided online tool, it produces more complex data. While the
DESE tool generates a comparison based on the name of the municipality, the DLS tool uses five
minimum/maximum filtering values. The use of standard deviations to select filtering values
may be incomprehensible to most citizens and thus appear less transparent.

Ability to Pay
The municipality’s level of wealth determines its capacity to compensate employees. The use of
comparable communities for salary negotiation is mandated by the arbitration provisions of
collective bargaining statutes in thirty-four states.15 Because compensation is a budgetary
concern, it is important that methods for selecting comparison communities include financial
metrics to gauge the municipalities’ capacity to compensate employees fairly—the ability to pay.
Two of the five viable models considered, however, do not include measures of wealth: the
DESE tool bases the selection of comparable districts on a specific student population, and the
two-ring method bases selection on proximity to the target district.
Each of the three remaining groups included some measure of wealth. The negotiated
method employed a filtering mechanism that included per capita income along with nonfinancial
measures (student enrollment, total population, and Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment
System performance). The DLS method included Massachusetts Department of Revenue figures
for per capita income along with indicators of the municipalities’ capacity to fund increases in
salaries. Population was the single nonfinancial metric.
The household income method relied on the American Community Survey section of the
U.S. Census. It is interesting to note that the household income comparison had the smallest
7
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difference in overall compensation levels from the TD. Research by Datta and Meerman suggests
that household income may overstate income; they suggest using household income per capita.16
Table 3 summarizes the key characteristics of each method.
Table 3. Key Characteristics of Methods for Constructing Comparable Communities

Method
DESE

DLS

Household
income
Negotiated

Two-ring

Self-serving
bias/
accountability
Favors
employees
(-144.4% )
Mid-point
between five
methods
(-102.0% )
Favors employer
(-78.8% )
Favors
employees
(-145.4% )
Favors employer
(-87.4% )

Transparency
High: DESE online tool, single
data value
Medium: construction of five
min/max values based on standard
deviation may be difficult for
public to comprehend
High: single data value
Low: comparison district groups
negotiated in executive session
High: based on proximity to target
district

Financial metric(s)/
ability to pay
None

DOR* per capita
income, average
single-family tax bill,
total municipal budget
ACS** household
income
DOR per capita
income
None

*DOR = Massachusetts Department of Revenue.
**American Community Survey.

Concluding Remarks
Using current salary scales, rather than average salary levels, to evaluate compensation equity
yields a quantitative measure of the differences between potential comparable communities and a
TD. The quantitative analysis provides ranking data to enable collective bargaining parties to
minimize the self-serving bias and improve transparency in the decision-making process.
Specification of clearly identified financial metrics gauges the capacity of the municipality to
work toward achieving compensation equity for educators.
Future investigations into the construction of comparison communities should seek to
establish minimum sample size. A minimum sample size would reduce the impact of the large
fluctuations in many salary scales. It would also provide a higher level of sample integrity in the
event that current-year salary data is in dispute. Other considerations for future study include
determinations about the level and frequency at which salary should be adjusted to achieve
equity with peer districts.

Notes
Luc Schuster, “Demystifying General Local Aid in Massachusetts,” Massachusetts Budget and Policy Center,
January 20, 2012, http://www.massbudget.org/report_window.php?loc=demystifying_general_local_aid.html.
2
Retiree Health Care Costs Are Straining Budgets in the State’s Poorest Cities, Massachusetts Taxpayers
Foundation Bulletin, September 22, 2014,
1

8

New England Journal of Public Policy

http://www.masstaxpayers.org/sites/masstaxpayers.org/files/Retiree%20Health%20Care%20Costs%20Straining%20
Budgets%20in%20State's%20Poorest%20Cities_Sept%202014.pdf.
3
Craig Douglas, “The Towns and Cities with the Best-Paid Teachers in Massachusetts in 2013,” Boston Business
Journal, May 16, 2014, para. 3, http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass_roundup/2014/05/the-best-paidteachers-in-massachusetts-in-2013.html.
4
Teacher Salary data is available from the DESE website at
http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/state_report/teachersalaries.aspx.
5
Aric G. Ahrens, “Completing the Puzzle: Comparable Community Determination for Illinois Municipalities”
(master’s thesis, Illinois Institute of Technology, 1998–2005), http://216.47.136.230/handle/10560/2793.
6
L. C. Babcock and C. A. Olson, “The Causes of Impasses in Labor Disputes,” Industrial Relations 31, no. 2
(1992): 348–60, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-232X.1992.tb00313.x; Marvin F. Hill Jr, and Emily DeLancenserie, “Interest
Criteria in Fact-Finding and Arbitration: Evidentiary and Substantive Considerations,” Marquette Law Review 74
(1990): 399, http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1717&context=mulr; Linda Babcock,
Xianghong Wang, and George Loewenstein, “Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social Comparisons in Negotiations That
Reflect a Self-Serving Bias,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, no. 1 (1996): 1–19.
7
OECD, OECD Guidelines for Micro Statistics on Household Wealth (OECD Publishing, 2013),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264194878-en.
8
Human Resources Services (HRS), Compensation Survey and Analysis, Town of Boxford Massachusetts, Final
Report (Andover, MA: HRS, 2012);
http://www.town.boxford.ma.us/Pages/BoxfordMA_Bcomm/BOS/HRSCompensationSurvey.pdf;
HRS, Town of Boxborough, Massachusetts: Compensation, Classification, and Benefits Study for Town-Wide
Positions; Non-Union Positions, Final Report (Andover, MA: HRS, 2013), http://www.boxboroughma.gov/sites/boxboroughma/files/file/file/compensationclassificationstudy.pdf; Minutes of the Board of Selectmen,
Manchester-by-the-Sea, Massachusetts, June 2, 2014,
http://www.manchester.ma.us/Pages/ManchesterMA_BOS/ManchesterMA_BOSMin/2014 percent20Board
percent20of percent20Selectmen percent20Minutes/06-02-14 percent20BOS percent20minutes.pdf; Massachusetts
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, Agreement between the Burlington School Committee and the
Burlington Educators Association, July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2014,
http://educatorcontracts.doemass.org/view.aspx?recno=44;
Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, Agreement between the Lexington Education
Association: Unit A and the Lexington School Committee September 1, 2012–August 31, 2015,
http://educatorcontracts.doemass.org/view.aspx?recno=138.
9
DESE, User Guide for DART for District and DART for School (Boston: DESE, 2015),
http://www.mass.gov/edu/docs/ese/accountability/dart/dart-user-guide.pdf,
10
R. G. Nunes, “Announcing a New Databank Resource,” City and Town, May 3, 2012,
http://www.mass.gov/dor/docs/dls/city-town/2012/ctown-may3.pdf.
11
Craig A. Mertler and Rachel A. Vannatta, Advanced and Multivariate Statistical Methods: Practical Applications
and Interpretations (Los Angeles, CA: Pyrczak, 2005).
12
M. A. Murray, “Comparable Towns, Contrasting Votes: A Study of Variables Influencing Ballot Initiatives in
Two Socioeconomically Similar Towns” (unpublished manuscript, Suffolk University, Boston, Massachusetts,
2007).
13
Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein, “Choosing the Wrong Pond.”
14
Charles C. Brown and James L. Medoff, “Employer Size, Pay, and the Ability to Pay in the Public Sector,” in
When Public Sector Workers Unionize, ed. Richard B. Freeman and Casey Ichniowski, 195–216 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1988).
15
“Binding Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector: Is It Constitutional?” William and Mary Law Review 18, no. 4
(1977), article 7, http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2456&context=wmlr.
16
Gautam Datta and Jacob Meerman, “Household Income or Household Income per capita in Welfare
Comparisons,” Review of Income and Wealth, ser. 26, no. 4 (1980): 401–18.

9

